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Abstract 
The question why a government chooses a specific service delivery tool to 
provide public service to its citizenry is a central intellectual inquiry in public 
administration. This paper develops a framework to explain the production and sector 
choices of public services by political-economic environment, organizational capacity, 
service market conditions, and nature of service. Using operation and financial data of 
Georgia county governments during 2000-2006, we apply the framework to analyze 
!"#$%&'()#*+,&"-.(/*01&)(-"$2&)"(#*,-#*$)&+%(3")&-&#+-4(5#)*-&+%(#+(,6"("55"),-(#5(5&-)'1(
conditions and political interests. The logistic regression results show that the choice of 
"7,"$+'1(/$#3*),&#+(&-(+"%',&2"18('--#)&',"3(9&,6(%#2"$+:"+,.-($"2"+*"($'&-&+%()'/')&,84(
:'+'%"$&'1()'/')&,84('+3()&,&;"+-.(/#1&,&)'1(3":'+3(5#$(1#)'1()#+,$#1(yet positively 
associated with conservative ideology. The choice of private sector is positively 
correlated with conservative political interest, increase in discretionary financial 
resources, '+3(,6"()"+,$'1&,8(#5(%#2"$+:"+,.-(/#-&,&#+(&+(1#)'1(-"$2&)"(/$#2&-&#+(:'$<",=(
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I .  IN T R O DU C T I O N  
During the last quarter of the past century, a resurgence of market-oriented 
thoughts had provoked many public sector reforms in the United States. Reform 
strategies included not only to run government like a business (Osborne and Gaebler 
1992; Gore 1993), but also to introduce market mechanisms to production and delivery of 
public goods and services to a great extent (Savas 1987, 2000; Kettl 1993; Seidenstat 
1999; Auger 1999). A variety of public service provision tools, such as outsourcing, 
which leverage resources and talents of government, private, and nonprofit organizations 
in various manners, have been explored both in theory and in practice (Stern 1990, 1993; 
Salamon 2002).  Consequently, the question why a government chooses a specific tool to 
provide public service to its citizenry became a central intellectual inquiry of public 
administration scholars.  
Past studies on privatization, outsourcing, or public-private partnerships have 
examined a long list of factors that affect a gover+:"+,.-(-"$2&)"(#*,-#*$)&+%(3")&-&#+4(
such as fiscal stress, economy of scale, market condition, unionization, conservatively 
&3"#1#%84(+',*$"(#5(-"$2&)"4(",)=(>,(&-()#::#+18('%$""3(,6',('(%#2"$+:"+,.-(-"$2&)"(
outsourcing decision is ultimately an economic decision as well as a political one (Kettl 
1993; Hirsch 1995; Sclar 2000; Ni and Bretschneider 2007). However, empirical studies 
have generated mixed finding about the effects of fiscal and political factors. The 
perplexing results may occur because of the multifaceted nature of fiscal and political 
factors. Measured in disparate dimensions, fiscal or political variables may have different 
"55"),-(#+('(%#2"$+:"+,.-(-"$2&)"(#*,-#*$)&+%(3")&-&#+=(?*$,6"$:#$"4("7&-,&+%()#+,$'),&+%(
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and sector choice studies generally intend to model the service provision choice@the 
choice of in-house provision, governmental supplier, or private provider (sometimes also 
including non-profit provider)@all in one analyses using multinomial or ordered logit 
(Brown and Potoski 2003; Feiock, Clinger, and Dasse 2003; Warner and Hefetz 2004; 
Joassart-Marcelli and Musso 2005; Feiock, Clinger, Shrestha, and Dasse 2007). Rather 
than differentiating the stages in a service outsourcing decision, such analyses may 
overlook the nuance of the complicated economic and political dynamics in the decision 
making process. In addition to the mixed findings, most of the empirical research on 
external service provision has been placed solely in the context of municipalities, little is 
known about these local behaviors in larger regions beyond certain metropolitan areas. 
To fill these research gaps, we develop a framework to examine the dynamics of 
political-economic environment, organizational capacity, service market condition, and 
nature of service in the production and sector choices of service provision (Ferris and 
Graddy 1986, 1988) and analyze the effects of fiscal condition and political interests in 
)#*+,8(%#2"$+:"+,-.(-"$2&)"(#*,-#*$)&+%(3")&-&#+-(*-&+%(#/"$',&#+('+3(5&+'+)&'1(3','(#5(
Georgia counties during 2000-2006. 
The article is organized as follows. The second section reviews the current 
understanding of public service outsourcing. In the third section, we introduce the 
theoretical framework of the two-stage service provision choice model, and discuss the 
focus of this study. Data and research methods are explained in section four, followed by 
the results of logistic regressions in section five. Finally, we summarize the findings and 
address implications to public practitioners and researchers. 
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I I . T H E M Y T H O F O U TSO UR C IN G  
As driven by the privatization movement and the reinventing government 
campaign in the past several decades, public sector organizations have adopted multiple 
service provision tools, such as outsourcing, privatization, or publicAprivate partnerships, 
in addition to the traditional in-house production and delivery of public services (Stern 
1990, 1993; Salamon 2002).  Among many of the new service provision tools, 
outsourcing undoubtedly has increased in the past three decades, and research interest in 
this area has also burgeoned. Railey and Tamkin define outsourcing as the act of an 
B#$%'+&;',&#+(/'--C&+%D(,6"(/$#2&-&#+(#5('(-"$2&)"(#$("7")*,&#+(#5('(,'-<4(/$"2&#*-18(
undertaken in-house, to a third party to perform on its behal5E(FGHHIJKL=(M+3"$(-*)6(
arrangements, '(/*01&)('%"+)8(B$":'&+-(5*118($"-/#+-&01"(5#$(,6"(/$#2&-&#+(#5('55"),"3(
services and maintains control over management decisions, while another entity operates 
,6"(5*+),&#+(#$(/"$5#$:-(,6"(-"$2&)"E(F!NO(GHHPJQL=(M+1&<e privatization, through 
outsourcing, the delivery of public service may be transferred to existing vendors in both 
the private and public sector.  
No matter it is in private or public sector organizations, the decision to outsource 
is often made based on cost-efficiency. It is widely believed that the beauty of 
outsourcing has been the relative production cost advantage of external service providers 
(Donahue 1989; Savas 2000). Numerous studies have cited monetary or cost-efficiency 
as a key factor in government outsourcing decisions (Kettl 1993; Hirsh 1995; Seindenstat 
1999). In recent decades, as local governments have been experiencing financial stress 
due to property tax revolts or decreased intergovernmental transfers, outsourcing has 
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often been considered as an alternative to reduce taxpayer burden (Hirsch 1995; Boyne 
1998).  However, empirical evidence on the relationship between fiscal condition and 
outsourcing is mixed. Boyne (1998) points out that most of the empirical results on the 
relationship between fiscal stress and outsourcing are statistically insignificant and 
suggests reconsider the theoretical relationship between fiscal condition and outsourcing. 
It is learned in some studies that local governments may adopt outsourcing to improve 
service quality and those governments that are in better fiscal condition are more likely to 
'55#$3(,6&-(/*$/#-"(2&%#$#*-18=(?#$("7':/1"4(O.R##1"('+3(S"&"$(FTUUVL(&+('(-,*38(#5(
outsourcing in school districts found that high levels of local resources were positively 
related to the amount of outsourcing. Therefore, past empirical studies may have falsely 
combined two distinct subgroups of governments@those pursuing service quality and 
those pursuing cost savings@into a single sample (Boyne 1998). In a recent study of 
intergovernmental contracts, Carr et al (2008) find that limited fiscal capacity often leads 
many local governments, especially townships, to work collaboratively with state or 
county actors to provide services; however, local governments with greater fiscal 
capacity, especially cities, are stronger potential partners and so are more likely to 
contract with other local governments using horizontal arrangements. 
In addition to economic rationalities, outsourcing decision is also subjected to 
political and ideological considerations.  Outsourcing decisions are often considered to 
have a positive relation with conservative ideology of limiting and downsizing 
government. Public decision makers with more conservative values tend to have stronger 
ties to private sector businesses and hence favor outsourcing, especially privatization. 
 5 
 
However, empirical evidence of political and ideological factors in outsourcing decision 
is very limited (i.e. Brudney, Fernardez, Ryu, and Wright 2005). Ni and Bretschneider 
(2007) found the impact of ideological composition of government decision makers on 
outsourcing decisions was discrepant, which somehow reflects the rhetoric value of 
outsourcing being used by both parties to win popular support. Their findings, however, 
also indicate that, despite the rhetoric value of outsourcing, political competition may 
hinder the decision, because the checks and balances of political control will prevent over 
usage of contracts. In addition, constituency interests in outsourcing are multifaceted. 
!"+"$'118(-/"'<&+%4(#*,-#*$)&+%(&-(&+(3&-'%$"":"+,(9&,6()#+-,&,*"+,-.(&+,"$"-,-(&+(1#)'1 
)#+,$#14(0")'*-"(%#2"$+:"+,-.($"1&'+)"(#+(#,6"$("+,&,&"-(5#$(-"$2&)"(3"1&2"$8()#*13(1"'3(,#('(
declination of local representation and inflexibility to meet community needs. However, 
outsourcing, especially to private sector, is consistent with high-income or business 
-"),#$()#+-,&,*"+,-.(&+,"$"-,(&+(-:'11(%#2"$+:"+,('+3(:#$"(":/1#8:"+,(#//#$,*+&,&"-=(
W*$"'*)$',-.()#:/1"7(&+,"$"-,-('1-#('33(,#(,6"(/#1&,&)'1(/*;;1" of outsourcing. This can be 
illustrated by the disparate interests embedded in different institutional settings of 
government. For example, the council-manager form of government is associated with 
professionally trained manager or chief administrator, whose professional training is 
expected to bring in the economic vigor desired for the government. Thus professional 
manager is more likely associated with outsourcing to attain economic benefits (Jang 
2006; Miranda and Kim 2006). However, professional manager usually connotes better 
organization capacity in management and production. In addition, having public services 
produced in-house and thus supervising the large amount of government revenue directly, 
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public manager could have more bureaucratic power over the organization. For example, 
Brown and Potoski (2003) found that, ceteris paribus, the presence of a professional 
manager is correlated with in-house service production. Jang (2006) in a study of park 
and recreation service (a periphery service to bureaucratic power) contracting found that 
professional managers are active in contracting municipal service deliveries to the 
external providers not on order to reduce expenditure level but for better service qualities. 
Therefore, despite the proliferation of literature on privatization, contracting, and 
outsourcing and the augmentation of causal factors examined by past studies, the effects 
of fiscal and political determinants to service provision decisions remain a mystery. 
Despite the multifaceted nature of these determinants, existing studies on contracting and 
sector choice, which uniformly have used a multinomial logit model, has not shined 
much light on these intellectual perplexities.  Those studies generally use the in-house 
provision of the service as the base case and compare it with other governmental and 
private provisions (in some cases, also non-profit provision). This method is not effective 
in observing the nuance of the political and economic dynamics in two-stages of 
outsourcing decisions: first, the choice of whether to produce services internally or 
externally (production choice) and second, the choice of sector with whom to contract@
other governments, private firms, or nonprofit organizations (sector choice) (Ferris and 
Graddy 1986), as it is reasonable to expect that some financial and political factors may 
have different impacts in production and sector choices. 
 
I I I . A F R A M E W O R K O F O U TSO UR C IN G D E C ISI O N 
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Drawing from the foregoing insights, we treat the service outsourcing decision as 
a two-stage dynamic process including the production choice and then the sector choice. 
The central thesis is that economic and political interests, along with other factors, may 
have different impacts in different stage of outsourcing decision. 
The production choice is primarily influenced by cost-efficiency considerations as 
well as the nature of service. Economic environment factors, such as economy of scales, 
fiscal capacity, and market conditions are expected to have an impact on outsourcing 
decision. The sector choice is ultimately a political decision though largely constrained 
by service nature and market condition. At this stage, public expenditure is at the 
discretion of decision makers to achieve different purposes, for instance, to subsidize 
private sector or to maintain government control, to pursuing better quality and more 
diversity or to persist traditional service provision channels. The nature of service is also 
a defining factor in sector choice. Governments may be more likely to outsource 
peripheral services than core services, more likely to outsource business-type activities 
than governmental-activities, and more likely to outsource services that involve lower 
transaction cost in the contracting process (Donahue 1989; Stern 1990, 1993; Globerman 
and Vining 1996; Hodge 2000). In some cases, the characteristics of the service alone 
define the sector choice for service with a pure public good or coercive nature is not 
likely to be outsourced to a private firm.
1
 
 In this study, we focus on the effects of fiscal condition and political interests. 
Fiscal condition and Political interests are two important of the political-economic 
                                                          
1 R6"('*,6#$-(9#*13(1&<"(,#(,6'+<(#+"($"2&"9"$.-()#::"+,(#+("55"),(#5(-"$2&)"(+',*$"(#+(-"),#$()6#&)"= 
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environment that relates to organizational production capacity. These fiscal and political 
factors may be measured in different dimensions, which may have different 
manifestations on the service provision decision. For instance, fiscal condition of a 
locality may be measured by revenue-raising capacity, the actual revenues collected from 
multiple tax bases, the availability of discretionary resources, or the change of capacity or 
actual revenues. Likewise, political factors of local service delivery may be reflected not 
only by partisan ideologies, but also by the level of political activity. By disentangling 
fiscal and political factors in multiple ways, we can examine their intricate effects on the 
choice of public service delivery. In particular, we will test the following hypotheses:   
! A government with better fiscal condition is less likely to outsource their service 
production (H1);  
! If a government with better fiscal condition does outsource, it is more likely to 
choose private sector services vendors (H2) ; 
! A government in an ideologically more conservative community is more likely to 
outsource its service (H3); 
! If a government with conservative ideology does outsource, it is more likely to do 
so to private sector vendors (H4). 
 
IV. D A T A A ND M E T H O D O L O G Y  
          We test the above hypotheses in the context of Georgia counties during 2000-
 9 
 
2006.
2
 The units of analysis are !"#$%&'()#*+,&"-.(service outsourcing decisions to 19 
common public services from year 2001 to 2006 (see Table 1).
3
 We use a sample of 
10661 observations to examine the production choice model, that is, the probability that a 
)#*+,8(9#*13(#*,-#*$)"('(/'$,&)*1'$(-"$2&)"(FBOMREL=(X"%'$3&+g the sector choice model, 
the sample size is 2870, where a local service is outsourced either to private vendors or 
other governments. The dependent variable is the probability that a service would be 
)#+,$'),"3(,#(/$&2',"(2"+3#$-(FBYX>ZNR[EL4(&5(#*,-#*$)ed.  
The two-stage model of outsourcing decision is presented by the following 
equations: 
[Table 1 about here] 
"
!"# $%% %"&$% '(#)*&(' +#")*,(,! -".*/"012*3/ ##$ # 4 "$*!5*3"/%#$$                  (1) 
"
64 012*3/ ##! -".*/"7869:2;*3/ ##$ # ."$*!5*3"/%#$$                              (2) 
where  
f = model for the production choice, g = model for the sector choice; 
i = service,  j = government, t = year, t -1= one-year time-lag;  
$I = a fixed-effect for service i; and  
X = a vector of independent variables. 
Description and summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2 and 
                                                          
2
 The data of public service provision come from Georgia Government Management Indicators Survey 
(2001-2006). The major sources of fiscal data are Georgia Local Government F inance Survey (2000-2005) 
by Georgia DCA, and Statistical Report (2000-2005). The primary source of socioeconomic data is the 
Georgia County Guide. The election data come from the Office of the Secretary, State of Georgia. 
3
 Georgia has 158 counties, among which there are 4 city-county consolidated governments, which are 
excluded from our data sample. Excluding missing data record, we get a sample of 19399 local service 
provision choices. Slightly more than half (10661 among 19399) of these services were provided, either 
locally or through outsourcing. 
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R'01"(\=(N(%#2"$+:"+,.-($"2"+*"-raising capacity is measured by logged per capita 
property tax base (PTCLG) and logged per capita sales tax base (STCLG). Property tax is 
the mainstay of local finance for Georgia counties, and so PTCLG is the major indicator 
of local fiscal capacity (Zhao, 2005). Local option sales tax is a smaller portion of local 
revenue than the property tax. However, Georgia counties with higher per capita sales tax 
0'-"-(6'2"(6&%6"$()'/'0&1&,8(,#(B"7/#$,E(,'7(0*$3"+s to nonresidents, which may result in 
different preference of service level and provision choice (Zhao and Hou, 2008). The 
actual revenue of a county is measured by logged per capita total revenue (TRVLG), 
which includes both own-source revenues and all intergovernmental transfers. TRVLG 
also reflects the actual budget level, because Georgia counties are required to balance 
their annual budget.  We also include the percentage of annual changes for these fiscal 
measures, denoted as PTCCH, STCCH, and TRVCH, respectively. A significant decrease 
of tax base or budget is an indicator of fiscal stress. An increase of tax base or budget, on 
the other hand, provides slack resources for local governments. We expect these fiscal 
variables to be negatively associated with the probability of outsourcing, because 
counties with higher fiscal capacity or expenditure levels may have higher organizational 
production capacity to provide services by themselves (H1). For services that are 
outsourced, however, counties in better fiscal condition, especially with more slack 
resources, may be more likely to choose private sector service vendors to achieve better 
quality or diversity (H2).  
[Table 2 and Table 3 about here] 
Political interests are represented by DEMREP, TURNOUT, and UNPAVED. 
 11 
 
DEMREP is the ratio of Democratic vs. Republican votes in gubernatorial elections. It is 
expected to have negative impacts on both the production choice and the sector choice, 
because counties with predominantly Republican voters may have a pro-market tendency 
that favors outsourcing (H3), especially to the private sector (H4). TURNOUT is the 
percentage of population voting in gubernatorial elections. Counties with higher voting 
rates, regardless partisan preferences, may have lower probability in both production and 
sector choice models, because residents that are politically active may favor in-house or 
public service to maintain local control in service delivery. Lastly, UNPAVED is the 
percentage of local roads that are unpaved. Construction and maintenance of local roads 
are considered a key service provided by Georgia counties. With similar level of fiscal 
capacity, counties with higher UNPAVED may have a bias again public infrastructure. 
Thus UNPAVED may reflect a choice of low public service level and is expected to have 
positive impact on the sector choice.  
In addition, we control for other variables that are considered important or 
typically included in past literature on local service provision. Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSA) is often used as a differentiator of urban or rural areas, which may affect 
the economy of scale or availability of service options (Honadle 1984; Walls, Macauley, 
and Anderson 2005; Feiock, Clingermayer, Sherestha, and Dasse 2007). We also include 
population, personal income, educational level, and the percentages of black, senior, and 
population under poverty (Feiock and Clingermayor 2001, Morgan and Hirlinger 1991).
4
   
 
                                                          
4
 Personal income is highly correlated with educational level and was thus dropped from the models.  
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V . R ESU L TS 
Regression results for the two-stage service provision choice are presented in 
Table 4. For both stages of choice, we include two separate models to account for two 
sets of fiscal variables to avoid multicollinearity between the actual budget level and 
revenue-raising capacity. For each model, we report coefficients, standard errors, and 
standardized odds-ratio of independent variables. In addition, to better interpret the 
results of Logit regressions, in Figure 1 & 2 we plot the predicted effects of several 
variables that are most influential to the dependent variables.  
[Table 4, Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here] 
! The Production Choice (model P1 and P2) 
The empirical results of fiscal variables generally support our hypothesis H1. Per 
capita budget level (TRVLG) and revenue-raising capacity (both PTCLG and STCLG) 
all have negative and significant coefficients, indicating that counties with better fiscal 
condition are less likely to outsource their services. With a slightly lower Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Model P2 has a better fit than Model P1. This suggests that 
the probability of outsourcing is more directly related to revenue-raising capacity than the 
actual budget level, but the difference is marginal. In particular, the standardized odds-
ratio for PTCLG is 0.787, that is, if PTCLG increases one standard deviation, the odds-
ratio of outsourcing would decrease by a factor of 0.787. If PTCLG increases from its 
minimum to its maximum, the odds-ratio of outsourcing may decrease by a factor of 
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0.238.
5
 Likewise, the overall magnitude of effect is about 0.416 for TRVLG and about 
0.598 for STCLG. For the annual change of fiscal condition, PTCCH and STCCH both 
have negative coefficients as expected. The only unexpected finding is the positive and 
significant coefficient for TRVCH, which suggests that the probability of outsourcing is 
higher if a county has a sudden increase of budget level that is probably due to increase in 
intergovernmental transfers, because the increases of property tax and sales tax capacities 
do not have the same effect. 
The results of political variables also support our hypothesis H3. Democrat-
Republican Ratio has a negative and significant coefficient in both P1 and P2, meaning 
that counties with strong Republican preference are more likely to outsource. This is 
consistent with our earlier expectation. The overall magnitude of the partisan effect is 
about 0.413, that is, the odds-ratio of outsourcing will decease by a factor of 0.413 for 
counties with mostly Democratic votes than for those with mostly Republican votes. The 
level of voter TURNOUT shows expected negative signs on both P1 and P2, but the 
coefficient is only significant in P1 (with a magnitude of 0.626). These results for 
TUNROUT reaffirms our assumptions that political competition hinders public decision-
making and that active citizens do not like services provided by third parties. Results of 
several other variables also confirm our hypotheses on organizational production 
capacity. Counties with professional managers are less likely to outsource. The result is 
consistent with previous findings (i.e., Brown and Potoski 2003; Ni 2007) and supports 
our presumption that an appointed manager connotes better organizational capacity and 
                                                          
5
 The result is calculated assuming that PTCLG ranges from -3 standard deviation to +3 standard deviation, 
and so the magnitude of overall effect is 0.787^6 = 0.238. 
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has the preference of developing public service in-house to enhance their bureaucratic 
power. Counties run by appointed professional managers rather than elected 
commissioners may be less likely to outsource because of higher in-house organizational 
capacity. Counties in MSAs are less likely to outsource, probably because they tend to 
have higher level of scale economy.
 6
  Though metropolitan areas often offer more 
service-provider options, county level governments may be central government service 
providers to other lower level agencies (Hoene, Baldassare, and Shires 2002; Carr 2004). 
Counties with higher socioeconomic status (indicated by higher EDULEVEL, lower 
POVERTY, and less SENIOR) are less likely to outsource, probably because they have 
higher internal organizational capacity.  
Overall, it is safe to say that results from the production choice model support our 
hypotheses that the decision of outsourcing is affected by both political interests and 
organizational capacity. 
! The Sector Choice (model S1 and S2) 
As is expected in hypothesis H6, the sector choice is predominantly affected by 
political variables in both models (S1 and S2). First, although Democrat-Republican 
Ratio is not significant, its effect is picked up by the negative correlation of BLACK to 
private suppliers. Second, as expected, counties with higher level of public roads unpaved 
                                                          
6 Feiock, Clingermayer, Sherestha, and Dasse 2007 found that cities in an MSA (both urban and suburban 
cities) are more likely to contract to profit-seeking firms than other cities as metropolitan areas offer more 
service-provider options, including for-profit providers. However, ICMA data shows that MSA urban cities 
are less likely to outsource while MSA suburban cities are more like to outsource (Walls, Macauley, and 
Anderson 2005). The focus of this study is on counties, which may have different outsourcing decision 
mechanism from that of cities because of their different services responsibilities, relative scale of economy, 
or roles in the interlocal service B:'$<",=E For instance, vertical cooperation may occur between cities and 
counties when they are on the opposite side of interlocal exchange. 
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are more likely to select private sector vendors in outsourcing. The overall magnitude is 
2.986 odds ratio. The results for BLACK and UNPAVED strongly support our 
hypothesis that counties that are more politically conservative are more like to outsource 
their services to private sector vendors (H4). Fourth, the coefficient of voter TURNOUT 
has the expected sign but not significant. It seems that the activeness of citizenry has 
more impact on the production choice rather than on the sector choice. This result reflects 
that bipartisan citizen groups are effective at preventing externalizing service production 
when their interests of internalizing control converge; however, their impacts in sector 
choice decisions may be traded off due to their divergent interests in public or private 
sector vendors. 
The effects of fiscal variables on the sector choice are at most marginal. With two 
sets of fiscal variables, model S1 and S2 are almost identical in their explanatory power, 
and they yield insignificant coefficients for most fiscal variables. The only exception is 
the annual change of sales tax capacity (STCCH), which has a positive and significant 
effect on private contracting, with an overall effect of 2.138 odds-ratio. It seems that 
governments with more discretionary resources are more likely to choose private sector 
service production. Another possible explanation is that sales tax base may not be a pure 
indicator of fiscal conditions 0*,('1-#('+(&+3&)',#$(#5('()#*+,8.-($#1"(&+(,6"($"%&#+'1(
service market.  Georgia counties with significant annual growth of sales tax capacity in 
recent years tend to be new regional sales centers in the south (Zhao and Hou, 2008). Far 
from major cities like Atlanta, these counties probably have higher organizational 
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capacity than most local governments nearby, and therefore they are less likely to 
contract to other governments for services.  
A surprising finding from the sector choice models is that education level is very 
closely associated with private outsourcing. The overall effect is about 57.042 in odds-
ratio. We find that in Georgia counties education level is highly correlated with personal 
income, and also positively related to conservative political ideology. It is possible that 
EDULEVEL in this context reflects an additional aspect of political interests associated 
with socioeconomic status. Professional management does not have a significant effect 
on sector choice. This confirms our expectation that organizational capacity is more 
important for the production choice than for the sector choice. 
 
V I . C O N C L USI O N  
Public service provision choice is a multifaceted, complicated decision. We 
disentangle the effects of fiscal conditions, political environments, and other institutional 
arrangements in the production and sector choice decisions with Georgia counties. The 
empirical results indicate that the effects of fiscal conditions and political interests vary in 
different stages of outsourcing decision. 
Overall this study fills an important gap and helps resolve many of the 
perplexities in public administration literature. It will also help public managers 
contemplating outsourcing in confrontation of cost-efficiency incentives. First, our 
findings help better understand the nature of outsourcing in public organizations. 
Outsourcing is a complex, dynamic decision. At different stages of decision-making, 
 17 
 
economic and political rationalities vary significantly. While in production choice, 
government decision weights more toward economic factors; in sector choice it is more 
likely to be affected by political considerations. Second, the findings help disentangle 
many aspects of the relationship between fiscal condition and outsourcing decision. 
Under fiscal stress, a government may choose to produce externally to gain cost-
efficiency; with more slack resources, it may privatize to pursue service quality and 
diversity. Third, they help delineate the complex interests associated with outsourcing in 
local political environment. Outsourcing, though contending the %"+"$'1(/*01&).-(&+,"$"-,(
in local control, se$2"-(-/")&'1(&+,"$"-,(%$#*/-.(3"-&$"-J(/#1&,&)&'+-(:'8(*-"(&,(,#($"9'$3(
their patrons; bureaucrats may exploit it to enhance internal control; and special interest 
groups may leverage it to strengthen or expand their business or employment 
opportunities. Finally, the results also point to some of the new areas for future research 
efforts. Besides fiscal conditions and political interests, the study of the characteristics of 
different public services, the competitiveness of local public service markets, and the 
natural and institutional settings of governments (i.e. the comparative advantage of a 
locality in a regional service market) can certainly uncover some more ulterior patterns in 
local public service outsourcing decision. As providing high quality service to citizenry 
will be the unchangeable theme of public administration, more research effort in public 
service provision mechanisms will be indispensable.  
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Table 1: Service provision alternatives (2001-2006)
Service Type In-house Outsource Outsource Notdelivery to other gov. to private provided
Animal control 47.70 10.88 4.29 37.13
Building inspection 68.16 4.99 0.90 25.95
Building permits 78.64 3.79 0.20 17.37
Construction/code enforcement 73.05 3.79 0.80 22.36
Emergency medical services 58.08 15.87 21.56 4.49
Emergency 911 73.75 12.67 0.00 13.57
Fire protection 70.56 16.17 2.10 11.18
Health screening services 22.55 19.16 4.49 53.79
Jail 92.22 6.39 0.10 1.30
Law enforcement 99.40 0.40 0.00 0.20
Planning 67.17 9.68 3.49 19.66
Public hospital 2.99 33.83 3.59 59.58
Public transit 35.93 7.68 11.18 45.21
Senior citizen program 53.89 13.47 9.18 23.45
Wastewater collection 14.27 17.37 1.70 66.67
Wastewater treatment 12.48 19.16 1.60 66.77
Water distribution 25.45 23.05 1.60 49.90
Water supply 20.66 27.94 1.90 49.50
Water treatment 18.76 26.15 2.59 52.50
1
Table 2: Description of variables
Variable Description
OUT Outsourcing [1], inhouse prodcution[0]
PRIVATE Outsourcing to private sector[1], to other governments [0]
MSA Metropolitan Statistical Areas [1], otherwise [0]
POPLG Population (log)
POPLG2 Square log-population
EDULEVEL Percentage of population over 25 with 4-year college education
POVERTY Percentage of population under poverty line
MANAGER Professional manager [1], otherwise[0]
TRVLG Per capita total revenue (log)
TRVCH Annual change of per capita real total revevue
PTCLG Per capita property tax base (log)
STCLG Per capita sales tax base (log)
PTCCH Annual change of per capita property tax base
STCCH Annual change of per capita sales tax base
UNPAVED Percentage of local roads unpaved
DEMREP Ratio of Dem/Rep votes in gubernatoral elections
TURNOUT Percentage of population vote in gubernatoral elections
BLACK Percentage of black population
SENIOR Percentage of population with age 65 or above
Note:
Table 3: Summary descriptives of production and section model
Production model Sector model
(n=10661, OUT=27%) (n=2870, PRIVATE=21%)
Mean St.D. Min Max Mean St.D. Min Max
MSA 0.30 – 0.00 1.00 0.27 – 0.00 1.00
POPLG 10.26 1.13 7.51 13.73 10.27 1.11 7.51 13.73
EDULEVEL 14.92 7.73 5.43 43.59 14.07 6.15 5.43 43.59
POVERTY 15.44 5.91 2.61 30.68 15.60 5.50 2.61 30.68
MANAGER 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
TRVLG 6.28 0.27 5.10 7.25 6.26 0.27 5.10 7.25
TRVCH 1.03 0.15 0.45 2.61 1.03 0.14 0.45 2.61
PTCLG 3.13 0.36 2.20 4.48 3.09 0.33 2.24 4.48
STCLG 1.94 0.72 -2.09 3.10 1.94 0.76 -2.09 3.10
PTCCH 1.05 0.11 0.52 1.77 1.05 0.10 0.65 1.60
STCCH 1.00 0.11 0.21 2.38 0.99 0.11 0.21 2.38
UNPAVED 27.00 16.68 0.20 66.70 26.29 17.04 0.20 64.40
DEMREP 0.73 0.46 0.20 3.65 0.72 0.42 0.20 3.65
TURNOUT 25.40 6.65 10.76 51.84 24.95 6.36 10.76 51.84
BLACK 26.45 17.64 0.12 85.79 25.83 17.85 0.12 85.79
SENIOR 10.08 5.02 0 26.58 10.27 4.91 0 3.28
Note: Fiscal measures are in constant 2000 dollar.
2
Table 4: Fixed-effects Logit regressions for the production and sector choice
Production: Model P1 Model P2
(OUT) Coef. St. E. S.O.Ratio Coef. St. E. S.O.Ratio
MSA -0.363*** 0.083 0.848 -0.437*** 0.085 0.819
POPLG -1.029*** 0.363 0.312 -0.685* 0.378 0.460
POPLG2 0.054*** 0.017 3.734 0.039** 0.018 2.591
EDULEVEL -0.042*** 0.007 0.720 -0.033*** 0.007 0.774
POVERTY 0.027*** 0.009 1.175 0.033*** 0.009 1.212
MANAGER -0.316*** 0.058 0.856 -0.318*** 0.058 0.856
TRVLG -0.538*** 0.112 0.864 – – –
TRVCH 0.420** 0.181 1.064 – – –
PTCLG – – – -0.666*** 0.100 0.787
STCLG – – – -0.119*** 0.051 0.918
PTCCH – – – -0.049 0.283 0.995
STCCH – – – -0.130 0.246 0.986
UNPAVED -0.009*** 0.002 0.856 -0.014*** 0.003 0.794
DEMREP -0.301*** 0.104 0.870 -0.319*** 0.103 0.863
TURNOUT -0.012** 0.004 0.925 -0.004 0.005 0.975
BLACK 0.002 0.003 1.037 -0.002 0.003 0.966
SENIOR 0.013** 0.006 1.067 0.016*** 0.006 1.083
AIC 9180 (df = 10661) 9150 (df = 2870)
Sector: Model S1 Model S2
(PRIVATE) Coef. St. E. S.O.Ratio Coef. St. E. S.O.Ratio
MSA -0.219 0.171 0.907 -0.282 0.177 0.882
POPLG 2.971*** 0.882 26.730 2.999*** 0.928 27.55
POPLG2 -0.164*** 0.043 0.022 -0.165*** 0.045 0.021
EDULEVEL 0.103*** 0.016 1.886 0.110*** 0.017 1.962
POVERTY -0.009 0.018 1.049 0.010 0.018 1.055
MANAGER 0.039 0.116 1.019 .029 0.118 1.014
TRVLG -0.007 0.236 0.998 – – –
TRVCH -0.279 0.416 0.963 – – –
PTCLG – – – -0.150 0.213 0.951
STCLG – – – -0.038 0.098 0.971
PTCCH – – – -0.344 0.619 0.966
STCCH – – – 1.142** 0.520 1.135
UNPAVED 0.011** 0.005 1.204 0.011** 0.005 1.200
DEMREP 0.241 0.256 1.108 0.295 0.162 1.124
TURNOUT -0.001 0.010 0.995 -0.001 0.010 0.994
BLACK -0.019*** 0.006 0.709 -0.021*** 0.007 0.684
SENIOR 0.018 0.012 0.917 0.016 0.012 0.922
AIC 2290 (df = 2870) 2290 (df = 2870)
Fixed effects for the services are not reported in the table.
* Significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level.
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Figure 1: Predicted effects on the production choice
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Figure 2: Predicted effects on the sector choice
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